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Market Reaction to Second-Hand News: 
Attention Grabbing or Information Dissemination? 
 




This paper deals with a long-standing issue in finance: whether the market reaction to second-hand 
information is caused by price pressure or by dissemination. We use the perspective of attention grabbing as 
a particular form of price pressure to analyze the market reaction to the dissemination of analysts’ 
recommendations through the press. This perspective allows the prediction of an asymmetric market reaction 
to “buy” and “sell” advice, which has previously been detected in a few other empirical studies but is 
otherwise difficult to rationalize within the standard price pressure hypothesis. In particular, we analyze the 
content of a weekly column in the most important Italian financial newspaper that presents past information 
and analysts’ recommendations on listed companies. In doing so, we find an asymmetric price and volume 
reaction. Contrary to previous evidence, we document a positive relation between the number of analysts 
quoted in the column and the price (volume) increase associated with positive recommendations. Because 
the weekly columns simply attract the attention of investors with no additional new information, it is natural 
to observe a greater reaction for the most “glamorous” stocks (i.e., the stocks most commonly followed by 
analysts). 
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1. Introduction 
The financial market efficiency literature has devoted some attention to the stock market reaction to 
the dissemination of analysts’ recommendations through print media. In an efficient market, the 
publication of previously issued recommendations should be considered as conveying second-hand 
information with no consequences for prices and volumes. The empirical evidence from the last 
thirty years, however, tells a different story: the publication of analysts’ recommendations induces 
abnormal movements in stock prices and trading activity.3 
This puzzling reaction has generally been explained in two competing ways. According to the so-
called Information Dissemination Hypothesis (IDH) [Table A.1], prices and volumes adjust because 
the publication of analysts’ recommendations is real news: the trades by analysts’ clients would not 
be sufficient to fully disseminate the information content of these recommendations. In contrast, the 
Price Pressure Hypothesis (PPH) [Table A.2] states that these adjustments are due to the irrational 
behavior of naïve investors. The key disagreement concerns the empirical evidence supporting the 
two competing theories with regard to the price reversal in the post-publication period; the price 
reversal is absent or partial in the IDH but present in the PPH.4 
The IDH studies are mainly based on two Wall Street Journal columns: the daily column “Heard on 
the Street” (“HS”) and the monthly column “Dartboard”. In both cases, “buy” and “sell” 
recommendations are quoted, but the small number of “sell” recommendations allows a separate 
analysis only for the daily “HS” columns. “Buy” and “sell” recommendations are accompanied, on 
average, by significant abnormal returns (positive and negative, respectively) on the publication 
day. These symmetric price movements are in line with rational reactions to good and bad news, 
respectively. However, there are doubts that the analysts’ recommendations discussed in the “HS” 
column have the nature of second-hand information (Lloyd-Davies and Canes, 1978). Some authors 
state that “HS” columns report rumors about changes in firms’ fundamentals (Pound and 
Zeckhouser, 1990; Beneish, 1991; Pruitt et al., 2000). In some circumstances, the stock market 
                                               
3 The empirical studies listed in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix analyze printed columns based on analysts’ explicit 
or implicit recommendations. Other studies consider the publication of columnists’ recommendations/rumors (Lee, 
1986; Ferreira and Smith, 1999; Muradoğlu and Yazici, 2002; Kiymaz, 2002) or TV broadcast analysts’ 
recommendations (Pari, 1987; Ferreira and Smith, 2003). 
4 Pruitt et al. (2000) do not observe a reversal in prices, but they find that the positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement day and in the following days are related to increased buying by individual investors. 
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completely anticipates the information content of analysts’ recommendations mentioned in the 
press. Pound and Zeckhouser (1990), focusing on takeover rumors, find no abnormal return on the 
publication day in the “HS” column and a price run-up in the previous month. Beneish (1991) finds 
no price reaction on the publication day5 but significant abnormal returns in the two previous days, 
when “HS” discusses a single firm. One possible explanation is that the consensus in the “HS” 
column is formed from analysts’ recommendations. An alternative explanation is related to the 
analysts’ incentives to submit information to “HS” before disseminating it to their private clients. 
This could be the case if the analysts trade on the firms they cover or if they are trying to increase 
their reputation and visibility through press coverage. However, there are costs in terms of 
reputation (and potentially also in terms of employment) associated with the possibility that the 
clients would find out about this unfair behavior (Beneish, 1991). 
The PPH studies essentially cover two columns: the weekly Business Week column “Inside Wall 
Street” and the monthly Wall Street Journal column “Dartboard” (which is also used in IDH 
studies). The evidence mainly regards “buy” recommendations. The few studies that also 
investigate “sell” recommendations (Sant and Zaman, 1996; Lidén, 2007)6 show a significant price 
increase for positive advice and no abnormal returns for negative advice; this asymmetric price 
reaction is difficult to rationalize within the PPH because it is not clear why naïve investors should 
irrationally react to “buy” recommendations while disregarding “sell” recommendations. Moreover, 
Albert and Smaby (1996) document that the post-publication price reversal shown in the PPH 
studies using “Dartboard” has a methodological explanation: most stocks recommended by analysts 
in the column tend to be momentum stocks; therefore, a pre-event estimate of the market model 
generates inflated alpha values that bias the post-event normal return upward, leading to negative 
abnormal returns in the days after publication. 
In short, both the IDH and the PPH reveal some empirical weaknesses: the doubts on the second-
hand nature of “HS” recommendations for the former and the methodological bias behind the post-
publication price reversal and the puzzling asymmetric price reaction for the latter. 
Post-publication price performance, however, is not the only way to evaluate the degree of 
irrationality in the market reaction to second-hand information. Another possibility is to look for the 
                                               
5 For the whole sample, however, the price reaction on the publication day is statistically different from zero. 
6 A third study exists (Trahan and Bolster, 1995), but the sample of “sell” recommendation is limited to eleven 
observations. 
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attention-grabbing potential of printed columns disseminating analysts’ recommendations. Second-
hand information may increase the attention focused on the company, putting price pressure on its 
stocks (Trahan and Bolster, 1995). The Attention-Grabbing Hypothesis (AGH) states that individual 
investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008). Human beings have 
bounded rationality; therefore, individual investors face a major search problem in buying decisions 
because there are thousands of stocks in the investment set from which to choose. In contrast, 
selling decisions are much easier because the set is limited to stocks already included in the 
portfolio, given that retail investors usually do not sell short. To simplify the search problem, 
investors rely on the “availability heuristic” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and confine the 
investment set to the stocks that capture their attention. Once attention has reduced the choice set, 
the stocks to buy are picked up following individual preferences, i.e., investors do not buy all of the 
attention-grabbing stocks (Odean, 1999). In this perspective, the AGH predicts an asymmetric 
market reaction to “buy” and “sell” recommendations on the publication day: positive and 
significant abnormal returns and volumes for “buy” advice and insignificant abnormal returns and 
volumes for “sell” advice. 
Barber and Odean (2008) study the buying and selling behaviors of individual and institutional 
investors during days on which an event drives investors’ attention toward a particular firm’s stock. 
These days are identified by looking at three attention-grabbing events: i) a stock’s unusual daily 
trading volume; ii) a stock’s extreme return in the previous day; iii) a mention of the firm in the 
news of the day. In line with their hypothesis, Barber and Odean find that individual investors tend 
to be net buyers on high-volume days, following both extremely negative and extremely positive 
one-day returns and when stocks are in the news. However, professional investors’ buying 
behaviors are not influenced by attention. The news metric (whether a stock appears in the news of 
the day) proves to be the least informative proxy of attention, but this effect is apparently seen 
because the available data do not allow measuring the salience of news coverage. The authors also 
find that attention-driven buying is as strong for large capitalization stocks as for small stocks. 
Because many pricing anomalies are greater for small stocks than for large stocks, they argue that 
common psychological trading biases may result in different price reactions depending on firms’ 
capitalization. The focus of Barber and Odean’s paper is on investors’ behavior, not on the pricing 
impact of the behavior itself. In this paper, we verify the attention-grabbing power of particular 
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news coverage through the analysis of its price and trading volume consequences. The aim is to 
deepen the understanding of the attention-grabbing mechanism, especially in terms of the role 
played by the size and popularity of the mentioned firms. We also test whether the attention-
grabbing impact on stocks’ prices is entirely irrational or if it contributes to market efficiency by 
spreading public information about firms’ fundamentals. As far as we know, our paper is the first to 
examine the stock price reaction to the dissemination of analysts’ recommendations through print 
media from an attention-grabbing perspective. In particular, we contribute to the literature 
proposing and testing the hypothesis of an asymmetric price reaction. These elements differentiate 
our paper from others that test the AGH by focusing on different events. Seasholes and Wu (2004) 
find that unsophisticated investors are net buyers of stocks that hit their daily upper price limits the 
day before; they document a transitory impact on prices with reversion to pre-event levels within 
ten trading days. Fehle et al. (2005) study the attention-grabbing potential of the TV commercials in 
19 Super Bowl broadcasts and show that recognizable companies (with a number of ads greater 
than the sample mean) experience a positive price reaction that persists in the 20-day post-event 
period. 
Our potential attention-grabbing event is the weekly column “The Stock of the Week,” which 
appears in Plus, the weekly investment magazine edited by Il Sole 24 Ore, the top Italian financial 
newspaper. Plus is ready for press on Thursday evening, but it is published two days later, on 
Saturday (along with the main newspaper). These Saturday columns share the same features: 
author, page layout, dimension (two pages), position inside the magazine and type of information 
provided (balance sheet and income statement data, managers’ outlook, past stock price 
performance and analysts’ recommendations). Often, but not always, the column also provides 
analysts’ consensus forecast and recommendation as well as the expected price-earnings ratios of 
comparable companies. These common characteristics make our events homogeneous in terms of 
attention-grabbing power with the exception of the spin of analysts’ recommendations, which can 
be positive, neutral or negative. The column does not contain genuine news because all of the data 
presented and information provided are already part of the public domain. Thus, the data should 
already be known, at least to professional investors. However, we find a positive abnormal market 
reaction to the publication of the column when analysts grade the stock as a good opportunity, 
suggesting that the second-hand information irrationally affects individual investors’ buying 
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decisions. This evidence supports the AGH and shows that attention grabbing is able to induce a 
significant and asymmetric market reaction. The finding that the price surge is positively related to 
the popularity of the stock (proxied by the number of quoted analysts) provides additional support 
to the AGH. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Sample selection and data 
We collected all 165 “Stock of the Week” columns published from January 2nd, 2005 to June 30th, 
2009 that were devoted to a domestic company listed in the Italian Stock Exchange. In particular, 
we analyze companies listed in two major markets managed by Borsa Italiana: MTA (Mercato 
Telematico Azionario) and Expandi. MTA was Borsa Italiana’s electronic market, on which stocks, 
convertible bonds, warrants and option rights were traded. MTA was the main Italian stock market. 
Expandi was the market dedicated to smaller companies. The two markets had different listing 
requirements and partially different trading rules. On September 19th, 2005, a new market structure 
was introduced. In particular, within MTA, companies were divided into three segments: Blue Chip, 
Star and Standard. Blue Chip is the segment dedicated to companies with a capitalization of over 1 
billion euro. Standard is the market for all companies with a capitalization between 1 billion and 40 
million euro. Star is the segment for companies with a capitalization of less than 1 billion euro that 
voluntarily comply with strict requirements on liquidity, transparency and corporate governance. 
MTA and Expandi merged on June 15th, 2009.7 
The “Stock of the Week” columns covering foreign companies are excluded from the sample 
because it is unrealistic to think that foreign investors read Plus (which is written in Italian) for 
news about non-Italian companies. Therefore, the column should not affect foreign investors’ 
buying and selling decisions regarding non-Italian listed companies. Furthermore, Italian retail 
investors tend to hold mainly Italian stocks and trade them in the domestic market (Felettigh and 
Monti, 2008). Thus, their trading is not expected to have a relevant influence on prices and volumes 
in foreign stock markets. 
                                               
7 Up to the merger with MTA, we include all of the companies listed on the Expandi in the Standard group (eight 
observations). 
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The final sample includes 154 observations after removing nine columns concerning companies 
with a short listing history (less than 130 trading days before the column’s date), one column 
dealing with two companies at once and one column distributed with some delay due to a strike. For 
each column, we collected the following data: a) name of the company analyzed; b) stock price and 
the numbers of traded and outstanding shares on a daily basis from 255 trading days before and 10 
trading days after the event day (source: DataStream); c) market segment of the listing as of the 
“event day” (source: Borsa Italiana website); d) the company’s sector of activity (source: Borsa 
Italiana web site); e) company size in terms of book value and capitalization; f) spin of the analysts’ 
recommendations reported in the column (positive vs. neutral and negative); g) consensus earnings 
forecasts and consensus recommendation reported in the column; and h) number of analysts whose 
recommendations are reported in the column. 
2.2 Sample composition and descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the composition and the time distribution of our sample in terms of the number of 
events, availability of analysts’ consensus, detailed recommendations and economic sectors. 
 
Table 1 - Sample composition 
The table shows the composition and the distribution in time of our sample. Number of events, availability of analysts’ 
consensus, detailed recommendations and economic sectors are considered. 
  Total 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009.1H 
  Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
Columns 154 100 24 15.58 27 17.53 34 22.08 45 29.22 24 15.58 
Columns by Stock Market Segment 
Blue Chips 19 12.34 2 8.33 6 22.22 6 17.65 3 6.67 2 8.33 
Star 80 51.95 13 54.17 11 40.74 18 52.94 27 60.00 11 45.83 
Standard and Expandi 55 35.71 9 37.50 10 37.04 10 29.41 15 33.33 11 45.83 
Total 154 100 24 100 27 100 34 100 45 100 24 100 
Columns by Consensus Recommendation 
Positive 72 46.75 2 8.33 19 70.37 22 64.71 17 37.78 12 50.00 
Neutral and Negative 31 20.13 1 4.17 6 22.22 8 23.53 10 22.22 6 25.00 
No Consensus 51 33.12 21 87.50 2 7.41 4 11.76 18 40.00 6 25.00 
Total 154 100 24 100 27 100 34 100 45 100 24 100 
Columns by Analysts’ Recommendation 
Positive 92 59.74 11 45.83 18 66.67 22 64.71 26 57.78 15 62.50 
Neutral and Negative 52 33.77 8 33.33 7 25.93 11 32.35 18 40.00 8 33.33 
No Recommendations 10 6.49 5 20.83 2 7.41 1 2.94 1 2.22 1 4.17 
Total 154 100 24 100 27 100 34 100 45 100 24 100 
Columns by Company’s Economic Sector 
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Industrial Goods and 
Services 35 22.73 5 20.83 8 29.63 9 26.47 9 20.00 4 16.67 
Banks 20 12.99 4 16.67 4 14.81 2 5.88 6 13.33 4 16.67 
Financial Services 18 11.69 3 12.50 4 14.81 3 8.82 5 11.11 3 12.50 
Construction and 
Materials 16 10.39 2 8.33 3 11.11 3 8.82 4 8.89 4 16.67 
Personal and Household 
Goods 11 7.14 1 4.17 2 7.41 3 8.82 3 6.67 2 8.33 
Technology 11 7.14 2 8.33 1 3.70 4 11.76 3 6.67 1 4.17 
Automobiles and Parts 10 6.49 2 8.33 1 3.70 3 8.82 4 8.89 0 0.00 
Utilities 7 4.55 2 8.33 0 0.00 1 2.94 3 6.67 1 4.17 
Media 5 3.25 1 4.17 1 3.70 0 0.00 2 4.44 1 4.17 
Health Care 5 3.25 2 8.33 0 0.00 1 2.94 2 4.44 0 0.00 
Retail 5 3.25 0 0.00 1 3.70 1 2.94 2 4.44 1 4.17 
Chemicals 4 2.60 0 0.00 1 3.70 2 5.88 0 0.00 1 4.17 
Insurance 2 1.30 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.94 1 2.22 0 0.00 
Oil and Gas 2 1.30 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.22 1 4.17 
Basic Resources 1 0.65 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.94 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Food and Beverages 1 0.65 0 0.00 1 3.70 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Telecommunications 1 0.65 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.17 
Total 154 100 24 100 27 100 34 100 45 100 24 100 
 
We selected the time period to include bull and bear stock market cycles of almost equivalent 
lengths.8 Our events are not uniformly distributed over time because they are concentrated in the 
period of 2007-2008 (51% of the sample). This distribution is due to the number of columns 
covering foreign companies, which was particularly high in the first two years of our sample. 
Nevertheless, exactly half of the events (77) took place during the bear market cycle (June 1, 2007 – 
March 10, 2009) and half during the bull market cycle. 
The 154 columns examined cover 86 firms because some companies were analyzed more than once, 
though never in the same year: four companies were the “Stock of the Week” four times each; 13 
companies three times; 30 companies two times; and 39 companies one time. 
Most events are related to companies listed in the Star (51.9%) or Standard (37.5%) segments. The 
presence of Blue Chips is usually negligible, except for 2006 and 2007, when they represent about 
20% of the cases. Analysts’ recommendations are reported in all but ten cases (93.5%) and a 
consensus recommendation is reported in two thirds of the events. 
The weight of positive ratings based on analysts’ recommendations is slightly higher than the one 
based on the consensus recommendation reported in the column: 69.9% versus 63.9%. 
                                               
8 The turning points from bull to bear and from bear to bull are, respectively, May 31st, 2007, and March 11th, 2009. 
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The time distribution of positive advice varies from 57.9% in 2005 to 72% in 2007 for the analysts’ 
recommendations and from 63% to 76% for the consensus recommendations. In both cases, we 
observe the highest fraction of positive spin in 2006 and 2007 and the lowest values occur in 2005 
and 2008 for the analysts’ recommendations and in 2008 for the consensus recommendations. The 
sample includes 17 sectors, none of which exceed, on average, one fourth of the observations.9 Not 
surprisingly given the structure of the Italian economy, the most frequently recurring sectors are 
Industrial Good & Services (22.7%), Banks (13%), Financial Services (11.7%) and Construction & 
Material (10.4%). 
The relevance, for our purposes, of the distinction between events with positive vs. neutral or 
negative recommendations requires the analysis of the characteristics of the two groups. Table 2 
reports some descriptive statistics concerning the number of analysts mentioned in the column, the 
firm’s size (book value and capitalization), the price-to-book value, the pre-event market-adjusted 
performance and the variability of earning forecasts. The book value and the price-to-book value 
refer to the date of the most recent financial reports shown in the column. The capitalization is the 
company’s market value as of one week before the event day. 
The pre-event performance is the stock return in the 250 trading days ending one week before the 
event day net of the market index return over the same period. The variability of the earnings 
forecasts is the absolute value of the ratio between the forecast range (the highest minus the lowest 
forecasted earnings) and the average forecasted earnings for the current year at the date of the 
column.  
 
Table 2 – Events by analysts’ recommendation: descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics on the number of analysts mentioned in the column, the firm’s size (book value 
and market value), the price-to-book ratio, the pre-event market-adjusted performance and the variability of earning 
forecasts. In the first panel, statistics refer to the entire sample. In all other panels, statistics are reported for two distinct 
groups: positively recommended stocks and non-positively recommended stocks. At the bottom of the table, equality 
tests for the means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney) of the two groups are reported. 




Number of Analysts 154 4.80 4 0 18 3.08 
                                               
9 The minimum occurs in 2005 with 10 sectors and the maximum in 2007/2008 with 13 sectors. 
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Size: Book Value (mln €) 153 379 216 -131 2968 506 
Size: Capitalization (mln €) 154 684 468 107 4534 718 
Price-to-Book Value 151 2.56 2.02 0.41 24.20 2.32 
Mkt. Adj. Pre-Event Stock Performance (%) 154 10.80 5.40 -44.90 106.60 27.70 
Variability of Earnings Forecasts (%) 99 58.90 20.50 0.50 1484.00 180.80 
Positive Recommendations 
Number of Analysts 92 5.50 5 1 18 2.96 
Size: Book Value (mln €) 92 245 174 -131 848 198 
Size: Capitalization (mln €) 92 577 479 116 2483 386 
Price-to-Book Value 90 2.98 2.29 0.59 24.20 2.76 
Mkt. Adj. Pre-Event Stock Performance (%) 92 12.60 7.40 -44.90 83.50 28.10 
Variability of Earnings Forecasts (%) 69 49.90 17.60 0.50 900.00 128.60 
Neutral or Negative Recommendations 
Number of Analysts 52 4.50 4 1 11 2.70 
Size: Book Value (mln €) 52 536 270 36 2968 702 
Size: Capitalization (mln €) 52 707 435 107 4534 873 
Price-to-Book Value 52 1.94 1.53 0.41 7.54 1.30 
Mkt. Adj. Pre-Event Stock Performance (%) 52 5.30 2.60 -34.80 69.60 24.00 
Variability of Earnings Forecasts (%) 30 79.60 22.60 3.70 1484.00 266.50 
Equality Tests (p-values) 
Number of Analysts   0.044 0.038       
Size: Book Value   0.000 0.001       
Size: Capitalization   0.221 0.438       
Price-to-Book Value   0.012 0.000       
Mkt. Adj. Pre-Event Stock Performance   0.116 0.136       
Variability of Earnings Forecasts   0.456 0.112       
 
The stocks with a good analyst rating have a higher price-to-book ratio and a higher number of 
mentions of equity research in the column as compared to the stocks with poor ratings. Both groups 
reveal past over-performance and a medium firm size (capitalization). The first group has better 
marked-adjusted performance, a lower dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and a smaller firm size, 
although these differences are not statistically significant according to a t-test for means and a 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for medians. The book value and the price-to-book value differ 
significantly between the two groups. 
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2.3 Methodology 
The spin of analysts’ recommendations is the key variable to investigate the attention-grabbing 
hypothesis. Each column has a section that synthesizes the most recent equity research covering the 
“Stock of the Week.” 
For each column, we measure the spin by first converting each recommendation into a score 
according to a standard five-point scale. We then compute the average score.10 We distinguish 
between positive and non-positive spins. Non-positive spins include both neutral and negative 
recommendations. In line with previous studies, neutral and negative recommendations cause 
similar price reactions (Lloyd-Davies and Canes, 1978; Beneish, 1991). 
2.3.1 Abnormal Returns 
To measure the market reaction to potentially attention-grabbing events, we use a traditional event-
study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985; Campbell et al., 1997). We use three models 
for normal returns: (1) the Market Model, (2) the CAPM and (3) the four-factor model by Carhart 
(1997).11 
We consider a 16-day event window [-5; +10] and a 250-day estimation window [-255; -6]. For 
each firm i and time t, we define the abnormal return as  titititi RRAR ,,,, |E X , where tiAR , , tiR ,  
and  titiR ,, |E X  are firm i’s abnormal, actual and normal returns,12 respectively. Averaging the 
abnormal returns (ARi,t) across firms, we obtain the mean abnormal return at time t, tAR . 
To assess the overall effect of events, we then aggregate the daily mean abnormal returns in the 
cumulative abnormal return from day 1  to day 2 ,  21,CAR . To test the statistical significance 
of our results, we perform both parametric (Boehmer et al., 1991) and non-parametric tests 
(Wilcoxon test). All of our inference results are then double checked by constructing a bootstrap 
confidence interval. 
                                               
10 To get the analysts’ consensus, we calculated the mean, median and modal scores. The results are unaffected by the 
choice of central tendency measure. 
11 All models lead to similar results. Therefore, we present the results for the four-factor model only. 
12 We consider excess returns over the risk-free rate. 
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2.3.2 Abnormal volumes 
We perform a similar analysis on volumes.13 Following Ajinkya and Jain (1989), we define the 
abnormal volume as  titititi VVAV ,,,, |E X , where tiAV , , tiV ,  and  titiV ,, |E X  are security i’s 
abnormal, actual and normal (logarithmic) volume, respectively. As a model for normal volumes, 
we regress the volume of each firm i on the volume of the market as a whole. Averaging the 
abnormal volume across firms, we obtain the mean abnormal volume at time t, tAV . The statistical 
significance of our results is tested as in the case of abnormal returns. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Abnormal returns and abnormal volumes 
Because the column publication day is always Saturday, our event days are all Mondays. However, 
after checking for a “Monday effect,” we do not detect any such effect in the period under 
analysis.14 
Considering all available cases, we find a significant positive abnormal return of 0.9% associated 
with volumes that are 32% higher than normal at the event day. We also observe an abnormal return 
on day -1, i.e., the Friday preceding the publication of the column. Two major factors can explain 
the abnormal return on day -1. Because the column is actually printed on Thursday night, insiders 
could trade on the information available in the column. An insider could be the management of the 
company covered in the column or the journalist himself. However, we can discard these 
possibilities given the reputation of the journalist and the strict rules in place in Italy on insider 
trading by the management of listed companies and journalists.15 The alternative explanation could 
be that concurring events in the days preceding our event date may cause the market reaction rather 
than the column itself. We consider price-sensitive events by analyzing all press releases and 
                                               
13 We also repeat all of the analyses using the turnover instead of volumes. However, the results remain unaffected. 
14 We insert a dummy variable equal to one when the day of the week is Monday in our regression analysis. Because the 
dummy variable is not statistically significant, we do not include it in the final regression model reported below. 
15 See the Italian law on financial markets (“Testo Unico della Finanza”). In particular, art. 114 prescribes that 
companies quoted in regulated stock exchanges, with no delay, have to make inside information publicly available 
when the information is deemed to be of a precise nature and is likely to significantly influence stock prices. Trading on 
the grounds of inside news is prosecuted by law (art. 184 and art. 187-bis).  
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza 
Dipartimento di Economia Aziendale – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41100 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 059 205 6927 
 
newspaper and magazine articles available on the companies’ websites in the time window [-1; 0], 
i.e., since the Friday before the event day.16 Among potential confounding effects, we check 
analysts’ reports in the same time window because their recommendations could drive investors’ 
decisions and thereby move prices. Taking into account these confounding events, we exclude 34 
observations and find that the abnormal return on day -1 disappears, whereas the one on the event 
date remains positive, statistically significant and of about the same magnitude (0.88%). In this 
case, volumes are 20% higher than normal. See figure 1.17 
Fig. 1 – Average abnormal returns around the event day (no confounding effects) 
This figure plots average abnormal returns in the event window [-5; +10] around the event date. The first plot refers to 
all observations. The second and third plots refer to positively recommended stocks and non-positively recommended 
stocks, respectively. To take into account potential confounding events around the event day, we exclude 34 
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16 We chose this window because we detect abnormal returns in the day preceding our event date, although no abnormal 
returns were found in the days before that.  
17 To be parsimonious, we do not report abnormal volumes in the tables and graphs. 
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Considering the 80 cases associated with positive analyst recommendations and no confounding 
effects, we find a higher abnormal return (1.16%) and volumes that are about 36% higher than 
normal. In contrast, there are no statistically significant abnormal returns or abnormal volumes in 
the occurrences associated with negative grades in the absence of confounding events. This 
evidence appears to be in line with the AGH, which predicts positive and significant abnormal 
returns and volumes for positive recommendations and insignificant abnormal returns and volumes 
for negative recommendations. 
Table 3 shows average abnormal returns at the event date as well as the pre-event and post-event 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for positively and negatively recommended stocks in Panels 
A and B, respectively.  
Table 3 – ARs and CARs for the positively (Panel A) and negatively (Panel B) recommended stocks 
The table reports ARs and CARs for positively recommended stocks (Panel A) and negatively recommended stocks 
(Panel B) in several time windows around the event day. To take into account potential confounding events around the 
event day, we exclude 34 observations from the analysis. To test the statistical significance of CARs, the table reports 
the t-tests, 95% bootstrap confidence intervals and non-parametric Wilcoxon V-stats. 
  CAR t-stat p-value Sign. Lower Upper Sign. V-stat p-value Sign. 
  (%)       CI CI         
Panel A: Positive Rating - No Confounding Effects (No. Obs. = 80) 
Pre-event [-5; -1] 0.42 0.99 0.326   -0.005 0.012   1925 0.144   
AR Event day [0] 1.16 4.05 0.000 *** 0.006 0.017 ** 2430 0.000 *** 
Post-event [0; +5] 0.70 1 0.321   -0.007 0.020   2090 0.024 * 
Post-event [0; +10] 0.08 0.1 0.921   -0.016 0.016   1816 0.348   
Panel B: Negative Rating - No Confounding Effects (No. Obs. = 35) 
Pre-event [-5; -1] 0.44 0.64 0.527   -0.009 0.018   338 0.716   
AR Event day [0] 0.36 1.17 0.250   -0.002 0.010   365 0.422   
Post-event [0; +5] -1.08 -1.68 0.102   -0.023 0.001   224 0.140   
Post-event [0; +10] -0.85 -0.7 0.490   -0.030 0.017   183 0.030 * 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
 
CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza 
Dipartimento di Economia Aziendale – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41100 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 059 205 6927 
 
To test the presence of an asymmetric market reaction typical of the AGH, we distinguish between 
the two cases: positive and negative recommendations. Although, in the tables, we consider the 
sample with no confounding events, we also check the CARs in the pre-event window [-5; -1] to 
verify that we eliminated all potential confounding effects. All tests (t-test, Wilcoxon V-statistic and 
bootstrap confidence intervals) reveal that pre-event CARs in both cases are not statistically 
significant. Then, we verify if the initial market reaction at the event day is eventually reverted in 
the following two weeks to test IDH vs. PPT. For the positively recommended stocks (Table 3 – 
Panel A), we observe a reduction in CARs in the days following the event day; CARs are still 
positive but are not statistically significant. According to the Wilcoxon test, the only exception is a 
slightly statistically significant CAR (+0.7%) in the window [0; +5]. It could be that the negative 
abnormal returns in the first days following the event day are not enough to reverse the initial 
attention-grabbing effect in the first week of trading. However, it eventually disappears because the 
CAR in the window [0; +10] is not statistically different from zero, i.e., we observe a complete 
reversal of the positive AR on the event day. These results are in line with the PPH: the column 
seems not to convey any value to investors but only to initially attract their attention. The case of 
negatively recommended stocks (Table 3 – Panel B) is peculiar because we do not find any 
abnormal returns at the event day or in the following two trading weeks18. It seems that only the 
positively recommended stocks are able to attract investors’ attention, as the AGH predicts. In the 
literature, just Lidén (2007) and Sant and Zaman (1996) document similar asymmetric price 
reactions on the publication day, although in the latter case, the negatively recommended stocks 
experience a significant price decline on day +1. 
3.2 Regression analysis of abnormal returns and volumes 
In the previous section, we detect a market reaction on the event day in the case of positively 
recommended stocks. In this section, we investigate the potential determinants of this market 
reaction through regression analysis. In particular, we propose two regression models: one for 
                                               
18 According to the Wilcoxon V-stat, we only find a slightly significant negative CAR in the window [0; +10]. 
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abnormal returns and one for abnormal volumes. We concentrate only on positively recommended 
stocks because we do not detect any market reaction for negatively recommended stocks.19 
Among the covariates that could explain ARs and AVs, we consider several variables: the number 
of analysts mentioned in the column; the pre-event market-adjusted stock performance; the 
presence of earning forecasts in the column; the firm’s size (natural logarithm of market 
capitalization); the price-to-book value; the presence of any confounding effect; the industry of the 
stock; and the year of the column. 
Because we use a four-factor model to detect abnormal returns, previous performance, size and 
price-to-book variables should already be taken into account indirectly by the four factors and we 
should find no statistically significant effect associated with these variables in our regression for 
abnormal returns. Indeed, we find that these variables are not statistically significant.20 For this 
reason, in Table 4, we present the final – reduced – version of our regression model, which only 
includes the economically relevant explanatory variables (i.e., number of analysts; presence of 
earnings forecast; confounding effects; industry and year).21 
Table 4 – Regressions for ARs and AVs of positively recommended stocks 
The table reports regression models for the ARs and AVs of positively recommended stocks. Coefficients, standard 
errors and significance levels associated with each explanatory variable are presented. In the middle section of the table, 
we report a joint Wald test of zero restriction for all the coefficients associated to the Industry and Year dummies 
included in the model (and not presented in the table). At the bottom of the table, some post-estimation diagnostic tests 
are reported: Reset general specification test; Breush-Pagan heteroskedasticity test; and Shapiro-Wilk normality test. 
AR Positive AV Positive 
  
 Recommendations Recommendations 
Regression Coeff. S.E. Sign. Coeff. S.E. Sign. 
Intercept 0.00 1.36   0.22 0.49   
N. Analysts 0.27 0.14 * 0.09 0.05 * 
Earnings Forecast -1.64 0.86 * -0.43 0.31   
Confounding Effect 0.59 0.90   0.57 0.33 * 
Joint Effects   Stat. Sign.   Stat. Sign. 
Industry effect F(13,65) 0.89   F(13,65) 0.74   
                                               
19 Because the ARs and AVs of negatively recommended stocks are not statistically different from zero, the dependent 
variable would be a “vector of zeros.” 
20 These variables are also not significant for AVs, so we exclude them from the AV regression. 
21 We do not report the coefficients associated with all the industry and year dummies to preserve space. However, in 
the middle section of Table 4, we present a joint Wald test on all the coefficients to evidence any Industry or Year effect 
on our response variable. 
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Year effect F(4,65) 2.17 * F(4,65) 0.84   
Multiple R-squared 0.27     0.27     
N 86     86     
Diagnostic   Stat. Sign.   Stat. Sign. 
Reset test   0.59     0.09   
Breusch-Pagan test   18.37     20.99   
Shapiro-Wilk test   0.97 *   0.98   
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively 
 
Before commenting on the results (Table 4), we observe that our specification tests do not reject the 
two models at all conventional levels of significance.22 
After controlling for contextual confounding effects, industry effects and year effects, we focus on 
the two main variables of the regression: number of analysts and presence of earnings forecasts. 
The number of analysts cited in the column has a positive and significant coefficient in both 
regressions. Because we are dealing with an attention-grabbing event, this result is in line with 
economic theory. The number of analysts may also be considered as a proxy for the popularity 
enjoyed by the company in the investor community and for the information set available to the 
market. If the column conveyed new information, more information available on the market (i.e., 
more analysts following) would result in smaller ARs (negative coefficient). Instead, because the 
columns simply attract the attention of investors with no additional new information, it is natural to 
observe a greater reaction (positive coefficient) for the most “glamorous” stocks (i.e., the stocks 
most commonly followed by analysts). It is worth mentioning that Sant and Zaman (1996), despite 
presenting an asymmetric reaction as well, find the opposite result with respect to the relationship 
with the number of analysts; in their study, the positive abnormal market reaction at the time of the 
distribution of Business Week affects only the stocks followed by fewer than twenty analysts (ten 
for reports with an analyst as a source) and the stocks in this group show a price reaction that 
increases as the number of analysts decreases. Our results support the evidence in Fehle et al. 
(2005) of a positive relation between the price reaction and the firm’s notoriety. Instead, the 
presence of an earnings forecast reduces abnormal returns and has no effect on abnormal volumes. 
                                               
22 We consider the Reset general specification test, the Breush-Pagan heteroskedasticity test, and the Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test. The latter test rejects the hypothesis of normality for the AR model. Thus, given the reduced number of 
observations, caution is needed in making inferences from this model. 
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To understand the negative effect on ARs, it is useful to show that when earnings forecasts are 
available in one column, the consensus recommendation is also available. Thus, the technical level 
and the amount of information available in the column increase when earnings forecasts are 
available. Because the attention-grabbing effect has an emotional nature, it is clear that substantial 
and technical information increases the complexity of the column, thus reducing the attention-
grabbing effect. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper deals with a long-standing issue in finance: whether the market reaction to second-hand 
information is due to price pressure or dissemination. We adopt the perspective of attention 
grabbing (Barber and Odean, 2008) as a particular form of price pressure. More precisely, we argue 
that if the market reaction has an attention-grabbing motivation, the publication of positive 
recommendations should induce a significant increase in the prices and volume of trading, whereas 
the publication of negative or neutral recommendations should have no effect. This emotional price 
reaction on the event day is also expected to revert in the post-event period. Our evidence supports 
both predictions. The attention grabbing theory allows us to predict an asymmetric market reaction, 
which has already been detected in a few other empirical studies but is otherwise difficult to 
rationalize within the standard price pressure hypothesis. 
Contrary to the available evidence, we document a positive relation between the number of analysts 
quoted in the column and the price (volume) increase. Because we are dealing with an attention-
grabbing event, this result is in line with economic theory. The number of analysts may also be 
considered as a proxy for the popularity enjoyed by the company in the investors’ community and 
for the information set available to the market. If the column conveyed new information, more 
information available on the market (i.e., more analysts following) would result in smaller abnormal 
returns. Instead, because the columns simply attract the attention of investors with no additional 
information, it is natural to observe a greater reaction for the most “glamorous” stocks (i.e., the 
stocks that are most commonly followed by analysts). 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the stock price reaction to the 
dissemination of analysts’ recommendations through print media from an attention-grabbing 
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perspective. In particular, we contribute to the literature by proposing and testing the hypothesis of 
an asymmetric price reaction. These elements differentiate our paper from others that test the 
attention grabbing theory by referring to different types of events. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 - Event studies regarding analysts’ explicit and implicit recommendations published in print media (Information Dissemination Hypothesis)   





597 Buy Yes +0,92% No - - Lloyd-Davies and Canes (1978) Wall Street Journal (N) Heard on the Street Daily 1970-71 
188 Sell Yes -2,37% No - - 
Syed et al. (1989) Wall Street Journal (N) Heard on the Street Daily 1983-84 16 Buy* Yes +0,98% No - - 
Pound and Zeckhouser (1990) Wall Street Journal (N) Heard on the Street Daily 1983-85 42 Takeover rumors No +0,07% No No - 
566 Buy Yes +1,54% Partial - Yes Liu et al. (1990) Wall Street Journal (N) Heard on the Street Daily 1982–85 286 Sell Yes -1,99% No - Yes 
286 Buy Yes +1,01% No - - Beneish (1991) Wall Street Journal (N) Heard on the Street Daily 1978–79 118 Sell Yes -1,00% No - - 
1982-84 332 Buy Yes +1,87% Partial - Yes 
1982-84 172 Sell Yes -2,30% No - Yes 
1984-85 234 Buy Yes +1,09% No - Yes 
Liu et al. (1992) Wall Street Journal (N) Heard on the Street Daily 
1984-85 114 Sell Yes -1,53% No - Yes 
Barber and Loeffler (1993) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly 1988-90 95 Buy* Yes +3,53% Partial - Yes 
280 Buy Yes +1,91% No - Yes Palmon et al. (1994) Business Week (M) Inside Wall Street Weekly 1983-89 
49 Sell Yes -0,67% No - No 
1559 Buy Yes +1,04% No No - Desai and Jain (1995) Barron's (M) Annual Roundtable Annual 1968-91 
152 Sell Yes -1,16% No No - 
Albert and Smaby (1996) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly 1988-91 140 Buy Yes +3,21% No No Yes 
Desai et al. (2000) Wall Street Journal (N) All-Star Analyst Survey Annual 1993-96 1157 Buy Yes +0,42% No No - 
Pettengill and Clark (2001) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly 1990-99 446 Buy* Yes +2,77% No Partial - 
^ Editor's and analysts' recommendations            
* Including sell recommendations (the study reverses the sign of the ARs for these securities)          
° Three-day period (from -1 to +1)            
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Yes = statistically significant                       
 
Table A.2 - Event studies regarding analysts’ explicit and implicit recommendations published in print media (Price Pressure Hypothesis) 






Elseviers Magazine (M) 
Beleggers Belangen (M) de 
Financiele Koerier (M)   
Weekly 1978-83 329 Buy Yes - 
  
Yes - 
Metcalf and Malkiel (1994) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly 1990-92 120 Buy Yes +3,24% - Yes - 
Wright (1994) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly       Yes         
144 Buy^ Yes +2,10% Yes Yes - Trahan and Bolster (1995) Barron's (M) 
Up and Down Wall 
Street, Investment News 
and Views 
Weekly 1988 
11 Sell Yes -0,93% - - - 
Mathur and Waheed (1995) Business Week (M) Inside Wall Street Weekly 1981-89 233 Buy Yes +1,71% - Yes Yes 
Sant and Zaman (1996) Business Week (M) Inside Wall Street Weekly 1976-88 328 Buy Yes +1,16% No Yes Yes 
Sant and Zaman (1996) Business Week (M) Inside Wall Street Weekly 1976-88 40 Sell No -0,25% No No - 
Liang (1999) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly 1990-94 216 Buy* Yes +2,84% Yes Yes Yes 
Pruit et al. (2000) Wall Street Journal (N) Dartboard Monthly 1994-95 92 Buy Yes +3,46% No - Yes 
566 Buy Yes +0,37% Yes Yes Yes 






42 Sell No -0,36% No No No 
Palmon et al. (2009) Business Week (M) Inside Wall Street Weekly 2002-03 551 Buy Yes +4.61%° Yes Yes Yes 
^ Editor's and analysts' recommendations            
* Including sell recommendations (the study reverses the sign of the ARs for these securities)          
° Three-day period (from -1 to +1)            
Yes = statistically significant                       
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